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Cohen, L. Jonathan – Cognition, 1980
Kahneman and Tversky's critique of Cohen's position on adults' probability reasoning is not valid. If they think Baconian logic is normatively unsound, the onus is on them to explain why. It is valid and useful because nature itself is full of causal processes. (Author/RD)
Descriptors: Abstract Reasoning, Deduction, Hypothesis Testing, Logical Thinking
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Kahneman, Daniel; Tversky, Amos – Cognition, 1979
Cohen's (TM 504 890) formal rules of intuitive probability lack normative or descriptive appeal, and his interpretation of the author's findings is not compelling. (CP)
Descriptors: Abstract Reasoning, Logical Thinking, Mathematical Formulas, Prediction
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Zhu, Liqi; Gigerenzer, Gerd – Cognition, 2006
Can children reason the Bayesian way? We argue that the answer to this question depends on how numbers are represented, because a representation can do part of the computation. We test, for the first time, whether Bayesian reasoning can be elicited in children by means of natural frequencies. We show that when information was presented to fourth,…
Descriptors: Mental Computation, Probability, Bayesian Statistics, Intermediate Grades
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Cohen, L. Jonathan – Cognition, 1979
Until recently, norms of experimental reasoning have lacked systematic theoretical development. Thus, it has been easy for psychologists like Tversky and Kahneman to misclassify certain human reasoning processes as being Pascalian and invalid, rather than as being Baconian and valid. (CP)
Descriptors: Abstract Reasoning, Cognitive Processes, Higher Education, Logical Thinking