NotesFAQContact Us
Collection
Advanced
Search Tips
Showing all 8 results Save | Export
Peer reviewed Peer reviewed
Direct linkDirect link
Rule, Nicholas O.; Slepian, Michael L.; Ambady, Nalini – Cognition, 2012
Inferences of others' social traits from their faces can influence how we think and behave towards them, but little is known about how perceptions of people's traits may affect downstream cognitions, such as memory. Here we explored the relationship between targets' perceived social traits and how well they were remembered following a single brief…
Descriptors: Memory, Credibility, Infants, Cues
Peer reviewed Peer reviewed
Direct linkDirect link
Zhao, Jiaying; Crupi, Vincenzo; Tentori, Katya; Fitelson, Branden; Osherson, Daniel – Cognition, 2012
Bayesian orthodoxy posits a tight relationship between conditional probability and updating. Namely, the probability of an event "A" after learning "B" should equal the conditional probability of "A" given "B" prior to learning "B". We examine whether ordinary judgment conforms to the orthodox view. In three experiments we found substantial…
Descriptors: Probability, Thinking Skills, Correlation, Experiments
Peer reviewed Peer reviewed
Direct linkDirect link
Kaneko, Takaaki; Tomonaga, Masaki – Cognition, 2012
It is important to monitor feedback related to the intended result of an action while executing that action. This monitoring process occurs hierarchically; that is, sensorimotor processing occurs at a lower level, and conceptual representation of action goals occurs at a higher level. Although the hierarchical nature of self-monitoring may derive…
Descriptors: Evidence, Evolution, Primary Sources, Feedback (Response)
Peer reviewed Peer reviewed
Direct linkDirect link
Pennycook, Gordon; Cheyne, James Allan; Seli, Paul; Koehler, Derek J.; Fugelsang, Jonathan A. – Cognition, 2012
An analytic cognitive style denotes a propensity to set aside highly salient intuitions when engaging in problem solving. We assess the hypothesis that an analytic cognitive style is associated with a history of questioning, altering, and rejecting (i.e., unbelieving) supernatural claims, both religious and paranormal. In two studies, we examined…
Descriptors: Cognitive Style, Ideology, Cognitive Ability, Beliefs
Peer reviewed Peer reviewed
Direct linkDirect link
Kalish, Charles W. – Cognition, 2010
Two experiments explored children's and adults' use of examples to make conditional predictions. In Experiment 1 adults (N = 20) but not 4-year-olds (N = 21) or 8-year-olds (N =1 8) distinguished predictable from unpredictable features when features were partially correlated (e.g., necessary but not sufficient). Children did make reliable…
Descriptors: Prediction, Memory, Correlation, Comparative Analysis
Peer reviewed Peer reviewed
Direct linkDirect link
Marti, Sebastien; Sackur, Jerome; Sigman, Mariano; Dehaene, Stanislas – Cognition, 2010
Psychologists often dismiss introspection as an inappropriate measure, yet subjects readily volunteer detailed descriptions of the time and effort that they spent on a task. Are such reports really so inaccurate? We asked subjects to perform a psychological refractory period experiment followed by extensive quantified introspection. On each trial,…
Descriptors: Schemata (Cognition), Prediction, Psychology, Phenomenology
Peer reviewed Peer reviewed
Direct linkDirect link
Gilmore, Camilla K.; McCarthy, Shannon E.; Spelke, Elizabeth S. – Cognition, 2010
Children take years to learn symbolic arithmetic. Nevertheless, non-human animals, human adults with no formal education, and human infants represent approximate number in arrays of objects and sequences of events, and they use these capacities to perform approximate addition and subtraction. Do children harness these abilities when they begin to…
Descriptors: Mathematics Achievement, Symbols (Mathematics), Kindergarten, Arithmetic
Peer reviewed Peer reviewed
Direct linkDirect link
van Dijck, Jean-Philippe; Gevers, Wim; Fias, Wim – Cognition, 2009
In this study, we examined the nature of the spatial-numerical associations underlying the SNARC-effect by imposing a verbal or spatial working memory load during a parity judgment and a magnitude comparison task. The results showed a double dissociation between the type of working memory load and type of task. The SNARC-effect disappeared under…
Descriptors: Short Term Memory, Spatial Ability, Numbers, Numeracy