The construct of metacognition appears in an ever increasing number and range of contexts in educational, developmental, and cognitive psychology. Can it retain its status as a useful construct in the face of such diverse application? Or is it merely an umbrella term for diverse mental phenomena that are loosely if at all connected? Here I argue…

Comments on the articles presented in this issue devoted to the Japanese perspectives on conceptual change. Discusses the overall conveyed message: The human cognitive system is a thematically organized knowledge base with agentive causality as the main mechanism for explain phenomena and analogy as the main mechanism for promoting conceptual…

Comments on the articles presented in this issue devoted to the Japanese perspectives on conceptual change. Suggests that different approaches to knowledge acquisition and conceptual change should be carefully examined in light of their implications for the teaching of science. Discusses critically the issues advanced from the Japanese…

Ideologizing is presented as the function of innate intrapersonal and interpersonal categorizing of experience. Ideologies flourish in open systems and decline in closed ones. Classical conceptions of science illustrate the process, to the end that an autonomous scientific ideology for the social sciences, including communication, is suggested.…

Examines two theoretical approaches on how we understand our own and others' minds: a causal explanatory and an interpretive social approach. Explores the relations between these views and suggests that the real challenge of the cognitive revolution is to unite the two approaches, to achieve a causal naturalistic account of the acquisition and…

Suggests that a better understanding of the development of children's theories of mind, requires theoretical perspectives that do not privilege the child who conceptualizes or actively participates in social interactions. Proposes that a better understanding of the relationships among brain, psyche, behavior, and culture should be promoted. (AA)

Examines Astington and Olson's proposal under the context of von Wright's and Hempel's theories of explanation and understanding. Suggests that for taking children's meaning making seriously, researchers should find a principled way to acknowledge the role of interpretation in scientific thinking even in the making of explanation itself. (AA)

Examines the relationship between causal-explanatory and interpretive-hermeneutic approaches to how we understand our own and others' minds. Suggests that the two approaches discussed by Astington and Olson are mutually enlightening but, contrary to the proposed position, are irreducible to each other. (AA)

Points out agreement that the concepts a child acquires are variants of those exemplified by the cultures in which they grow up. Suggests, however, that learners interpret these cultural practices in terms of models causally determined by their cognitive or representational capacities and by the stock of concepts currently available. (AA)