ERIC Number: EJ945784
Record Type: Journal
Publication Date: 2011
Pages: 11
Abstractor: As Provided
ISBN: N/A
ISSN: ISSN-0964-5292
EISSN: N/A
Available Date: N/A
Paying for Better Test Scores
Eisenkopf, Gerald
Education Economics, v19 n4 p329-339 2011
The paper investigates if the provision of financial incentives has an impact on the performance of students in educational tests. The analysis is based on data from an experiment with high school students who answered multiple-choice items from the Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS). As in TIMSS, the setup did not discourage students from guessing. Students with a salary based on individual performance did not score significantly better than students with a fixed payout or a payout based on the performance of the entire group. However, incentives have an impact. The group with individualized payments showed significantly more guessing activities than the others. (Contains 4 notes, 7 tables, and 1 figure.)
Descriptors: Foreign Countries, High School Students, Grade 11, Educational Testing, Performance Based Assessment, German, International Programs, Incentives, Context Effect, Student Behavior, Guessing (Tests)
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Publication Type: Journal Articles; Reports - Research
Education Level: Grade 11; High Schools; Secondary Education
Audience: N/A
Language: English
Sponsor: N/A
Authoring Institution: N/A
Identifiers - Location: Switzerland
Identifiers - Assessments and Surveys: Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study
Grant or Contract Numbers: N/A
Author Affiliations: N/A