The establishment of First Amendment protection for statements of opinion has extended the category of protected expression, but judicially created tests for distinguishing fact from opinion provide limited guidance for judges and place little constraint on judicial interpretation of language. In writing the Supreme Court's majority opinion in "Gertz vs. Welch," Justice Powell rejected the concept of the existence of a "false idea," asserting an absolute constitutional protection for ideas or opinions. The combination of this assertion and the constitutional requirement that judges pay attention to the context in which language is used has become a powerful precedent for the expansion of the types of expression protected under the defense of fair comment. However, an overview of the legal history of the fact/opinion distinction within the constitutional law of fair comment shows that existing tests do not ensure predictable, consistent protection either for freedom of the press or for reputation. While it would be unrealistic and unwise to expect judges to adopt the perspectives or methods of communication research, the law of libel is based upon judicial assumptions about communication, and an understanding of the questions raised by judicial interpretation of language would help explain the failure of existing fact/opinion tests. Judicial appreciation of a fine turn of phrase or a well-crafted sentence is too fragile a thread for protection of freedom of the press. The case law concerning the fact/opinion distinction is loaded with uninformed judicial assumptions about the way in which audiences interpret text and receive messages, and answers to communication questions would inform and clarify the legal question. (NKA)