As this paper demonstrates, studying abortive educational reforms reveals a great deal about the complex political dynamics involved in making (and unmaking) key policy decisions. Using case studies of France and West Germany, the paper argues that the state in advanced industrial countries tends to maximize the political gains derived from designing and appearing to implement reforms while minimizing political costs. This situation is attributed to the erosion of the state's legitimacy and to the vulnerability of the state's authority where education is concerned. The case of West Germany centers on attempting to introduce a comprehensive postelementary education system in lieu of the traditional three-tiered system. The case of the Fifth Republic of France (since 1958) is more difficult and diffuse, with projects aimed in various directions over the years. The central tendency was to overcome or reduce the internal stratification in secondary schooling. This paper explains each case, advances the theoretical argument concerned with state authority, and shows how the two cases support the design of educational reforms as a much less hazardous and more advantageous proposition than their implementation. France and West Germany hold no monopoly on the politics of nonreform in education; reforms elsewhere are also withering on the vine as rhetoric enlarges and financial capability decreases. Included are 32 references. (MLH)