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| Bids | 1 |
| Donors | 1 |
| Fund Raising | 1 |
| Income | 1 |
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| Journal of Political Economy | 1 |
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Peer reviewedGoeree, Jacob K.; Maasland, Emiel; Onderstal, Sander; Turner, John L. – Journal of Political Economy, 2005
We show that standard winner-pay auctions are inept fund-raising mechanisms because of the positive externality bidders forgo if they top another's high bid. Revenues are suppressed as a result and remain finite even when bidders value a dollar donated the same as a dollar kept. This problem does not occur in lotteries and all-pay auctions, where…
Descriptors: Bids, Income, Fund Raising, Donors
