Our goal in this paper is to better understand public pension funding dynamics with a focus on sustainability and intergenerational equity. We examine the steady-state properties of deterministic models and simulations of stochastic models to illuminate the implications of recently proposed policies to alleviate current funding pressures. We close by proposing a policy evaluation framework that better incorporates risk and the intertemporal tradeoffs between current contributions and likely future outcomes. We illustrate throughout with the California Teachers Retirement System (CalSTRS), which publicly provides particularly full projections of the underlying cash flows. The origin of this paper is our analysis of the funding policy recommended in an influential paper first presented at the 2019 Brookings Municipal Finance Conference (Lenney, Lutz, and Sheiner, 2019a; 2019b) that aims to stabilize pension debt at existing levels relative to the size of the economy or public payroll. The authors conservatively discount liabilities using a low-risk rate, but nonetheless conclude that public pension finances could be stabilized, in the aggregate, with relatively minor increases in contribution rates. By examining the underlying math, we show that this result rests on assumed arbitrage profits between the expected return on risky assets and the low-risk interest on liabilities. By treating this spread as risk-free and delinking contributions from liabilities, the model understates the likelihood of adverse future outcomes from the proposed policy. We show that, with uncertain investment returns, the recommended policy would carry significant risk of pension fund insolvency and a jump in contributions to the pay-go rate, which is much higher than current rates. We then illustrate the general policy issue of the tradeoff between current and future contributions, using the metric of the expected value of contributions, in a simple preliminary attempt to better incorporate risk into the policy debate over intergenerational equity. Finally, we conclude with our agenda for future research on how to generalize our formal approach to the analysis of pension funding policy for the intergenerational allocation of contributions and benefit risk.