Three experiments examined 3- to 5-year olds' understanding of the intended nature of pretend behavior. Found that 4-year olds understood intention as a mental cause of action and construed pretend behaviors mentalistically, but systematically associated ignorance of a specific animal with pretending to be that animal. Concludes that Lillard's…

The many authors debating whether computers can understand often fail to clarify what understanding is, and no agreement exists on this important issue. In his Chinese room argument, Searle (1980) claims that computers running formal programs can never understand. I discuss Searle's claim based on a definition of understanding that is empirical,…

Maintains that Lillard's and Joseph's articles provide an example of how apparently divergent empirical results may turn out to reflect interesting differences between children and adults. The researchers agreed that for young children, pretense is often, but not necessarily, intentional and neither found evidence for a representational…