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Johnson, Eric J.; Schulte-Mecklenbeck, Michael; Willemsen, Martijn C. – Psychological Review, 2008
Comments on the article by E. Brandstatter, G. Gigerenzer, and R. Hertwig (2006). Resolution of debates in cognition usually comes from the introduction of constraints in the form of new data about either the process or representation. Decision research, in contrast, has relied predominantly on testing models by examining their fit to choices. The…
Descriptors: Heuristics, Hypermedia, Probability, Decision Making
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Dodge, Arnold – International Journal of Progressive Education, 2009
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 requires public schools in the United States to test students in grades 3-8. The author argues that this mandate has been supported by the public, in part, because of the "availability heuristic," a phenomenon which occurs when people assess the probability of an event by the ease with which instances…
Descriptors: Test Validity, Federal Legislation, Testing, Standardized Tests
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Pachur, Thorsten; Hertwig, Ralph – Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 2006
The recognition heuristic is a prime example of a boundedly rational mind tool that rests on an evolved capacity, recognition, and exploits environmental structures. When originally proposed, it was conjectured that no other probabilistic cue reverses the recognition-based inference (D. G. Goldstein & G. Gigerenzer, 2002). More recent studies…
Descriptors: Heuristics, Recognition (Psychology), Primacy Effect, Inferences
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Tversky, Amos; Kahneman, Daniel – Psychological Review, 1983
Judgments under uncertainty are often mediated by intuitive heuristics that are not bound by the conjunction rule of probability. Representativeness and availability heuristics can make a conjunction appear more probable than one of its constituents. Alternative interpretations of this conjunction fallacy are discussed and attempts to combat it…
Descriptors: Cognitive Processes, Error Patterns, Evaluative Thinking, Heuristics