In 1997, I argued that with the loss of Piaget's theory as an overarching guide, cognitive development had become disjointed and a new metatheory was needed to unify the field. I suggested developmental biology, particularly evolutionary theory, as a candidate. Here, I examine the increasing emphasis of biology in cognitive development research…

The domain-specific approach to socialization processes presented by J. E. Grusec and M. Davidov (this issue) provides a compelling framework for integrating and interpreting a large and disparate body of research findings, and it generates a wealth of testable new hypotheses. At the same time, it introduces core theoretical questions regarding…

This commentary on J. Kagan (2008) addresses 2 issues. The first concerns the importance of studying developmental sequences and processes of change. The second concerns epistemological differences between contemporary neonativist approaches and classical theories of development. The commentary argues that classical theories of infant cognition…

This commentary endorses J. Kagan's (2008) conclusion that many of the most dramatic findings on early perceptual, cognitive, and social competencies are ambiguous. It supports his call for converging research operations to disambiguate findings from single paradigms and single response indices. The commentary also argues that early competencies…

This article presents a tentatively "balanced" view (i.e., midway between lean and rich interpretations) of pointing behavior in infants and apes, based upon the notion of intentional reading of behavior without simultaneous attribution of unobservable mental states. This can account for the complexity of infant pointing without attributing…

Kail responds to Stigler and others' criticisms of Kail's 1986 article and maintains that their criticisms are incorrect or implausible. He agrees with their conclusion that theories of cognitive development must include both domain-specific and general processes. (RJC)

Asserts that theory of mind is unique to humans and that its original function was to provide a more abstract level of describing ancient behavioral patterns, such as deception, reconciliation, and gaze following. Suggests that initial selective advantage of theory of mind may have been increased flexibility of already-existing behaviors, not…

Examines the relationship between class inclusion and age and indicates that class inclusion frequently appears to develop at a much later age than is suggested in Piaget's writings. (Author/MP)

Distinguishes two types of executive theories: (1) emergence accounts; and (2) expression accounts. Asserts that the meta-analytic findings reported by Wellman, Cross, and Watson (2001) are fully consistent with emergence accounts of theory of mind and do not entirely rule out expression accounts. (Author/KB)

Maintains that Teyler and Fountain's presentation (1987) contains several limitations, namely, that the authors do not (1) distinguish between learning and memory, nor between storage and retrieval; (2) address the role of knowledge-based influences in memory and learning; or (3) employ concepts that can accommodate developmental phenomena in the…

Reviews the literature on the effects of summer programs, and offers a reinterpretation of the role of summer learning in cognitive development. (PCB)

Maintains that there are core-specific and non-core-specific domains of knowledge, but that only the core-specific domains benefit from innate skeletal structures. Asserts that core skeletal domains are universally shared, even though their particular foci may vary. Emphasizes that individuals vary in terms of the noncore domains they acquire.…

Three experiments examined 3- to 5-year olds' understanding of the intended nature of pretend behavior. Found that 4-year olds understood intention as a mental cause of action and construed pretend behaviors mentalistically, but systematically associated ignorance of a specific animal with pretending to be that animal. Concludes that Lillard's…

Offers suggestions for future investigations of theory-of-mind development. Maintains that there needs to be: (1) greater focus on the development of understanding of desire and intention; (2) research on the role of language in theory-of-mind development integrating representational-development and social-interaction views; and (3) investigation…

Maintains that the results of Wellman, Cross, and Watson's meta-analysis on the false belief task are perfectly compatible with "early competence" accounts that posit a specific, innate, and possibly modular basis for theory of mind. Asserts that Wellman and colleagues' arguments against such views stem from mistaken assumptions…