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Kemp, Charles; Shafto, Patrick; Tenenbaum, Joshua B. – Cognitive Psychology, 2012
Humans routinely make inductive generalizations about unobserved features of objects. Previous accounts of inductive reasoning often focus on inferences about a single object or feature: accounts of causal reasoning often focus on a single object with one or more unobserved features, and accounts of property induction often focus on a single…
Descriptors: Generalization, Logical Thinking, Inferences, Probability
Oberauer, Klaus – Cognitive Psychology, 2006
The four dominant theories of reasoning from conditionals are translated into formal models: The theory of mental models (Johnson-Laird, P. N., & Byrne, R. M. J. (2002). Conditionals: a theory of meaning, pragmatics, and inference. "Psychological Review," 109, 646-678), the suppositional theory (Evans, J. S. B. T., & Over, D. E. (2004). "If."…
Descriptors: Models, Pragmatics, Inferences, Cognitive Processes
Griffiths, Thomas L.; Tenenbaum, Joshua B. – Cognitive Psychology, 2005
We present a framework for the rational analysis of elemental causal induction--learning about the existence of a relationship between a single cause and effect--based upon causal graphical models. This framework makes precise the distinction between causal structure and causal strength: the difference between asking whether a causal relationship…
Descriptors: Probability, Logical Thinking, Inferences, Causal Models

Chater, Nick; Oaksford, Mike – Cognitive Psychology, 1999
Proposes a probability heuristic model for syllogistic reasoning and confirms the rationality of this heuristic by an analysis of the probabilistic validity of syllogistic reasoning that treats logical inference as a limiting case of probabilistic inference. Meta-analysis and two experiments involving 40 adult participants and using generalized…
Descriptors: Adults, Cognitive Processes, Cognitive Psychology, Heuristics

Pelham, Brett W.; And Others – Cognitive Psychology, 1994
Five experiments involving a total of 268 college students indicate that people are especially likely to overinfer quantity or probability from numerosity when they are asked to make inherently difficult judgments, when they are asked to render judgments while performing a concurrent task, and when they are forced to make rapid judgments. (SLD)
Descriptors: Cognitive Processes, College Students, Context Clues, Decision Making