In this article, the author offers a causal explanation for the preschool education voucher policy in Taiwan. A causal analysis of voucher politics focuses on the process rather than the result of the innovation. The political success of private kindergarten business interests derives from their capability to open a space for collective mobilization in Taiwan's democracy. However, democratization has had different effects for different groups. Rather than assume an immanent logic of isomorphism, in this study the author analyzes the combination of contextual factors that paved the way for Taiwan's adoption of preschool vouchers. To illuminate the political process, he considers the bargaining model developed by Paul Burstein. In this model, social groups try to preserve or promote their interests by mobilizing their constituencies to change the current policy. Their ultimate success depends upon the ability to strike a workable alliance with the power elites. Thus, innovation in educational policy is seen as a function of multiorganizational interactions rather than as an automatic adjustment to societal needs. (Contains 2 tables, 1 figure, and 103 footnotes.)