Background: Maintaining the independence of contract government program evaluation presents significant contracting challenges. The ideal outcome for an agency is often both the impression of an independent evaluation "and" a glowing report. In this, independent evaluation is like financial statement audits: firm management wants both a public accounting firm to attest to the fairness of its financial accounts "and" to be allowed to account for transactions as it sees fit. In both cases, the evaluation or audit is being conducted on behalf of outsiders-the public or shareholders-but is overseen by a party with significant interests at stake in the outcome-the agency being evaluated or executive management of the firm. Method: We review the contracting strategies developed to maintain independence in auditing. We examine evidence on the effectiveness of professionalism, reputation, liability and owner oversight in constraining behavior in auditing. We then establish parallels with contracting for evaluations and apply these insights to changes that might maintain and improve evaluator independence. Conclusions and Recommendations: By analogy with the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 reforms in auditing, we recommend exploring using a reformulated Technical Working Group to encourage more prompt release of more evaluation results and to help insulate evaluators from inappropriate pressure to change their results or analysis approach. (Contains 21 notes.)