Focuses on Nelson et al's use of the term "theory of mind" and its meaning; alternatives to theory of mind; theories of theory of mind; arguments against theory of mind; and language and theory of mind. (KB)

Replies to commentaries by Mandler (1988) and Rochat and Striano (1988), focusing on Mandler's comments. Maintains that their disagreements are the result of deep meta-theoretical differences regarding a representational theory of mind rather than misrepresentations of fact. Discusses how their meta-theoretical differences result in several basic…

Notes that Nelson, Plesa, and Henseler's (1998) article addresses the issues of where social cognitive knowledge comes from, what form it takes, and whether "theory of mind" is an appropriate description of the social cognitive enterprise. Argues that researchers ought to get beyond the "theory" issue, and focus on the sources…

Comments on Lewis's ideas about reconciling stage and specificity in neo-Piagetian theory in this issue. Focuses on whether general stages, domain specificity, and individual diversity are compatible from a nonlinear, dynamic perspective. Suggests that, by using catastrophe theory, intra- and interindividual diversity and domain specificity can be…

To resolve tension between general stages and conceptual specificity in neo-Piagetian theory, R. Case introduced the idea of central conceptual structures. To resolve difficulties of separating developmental level and conceptual diversity, this article reconceptualizes central conceptual structures as self-organizing systems that stabilize in…

Comments on Lewis's ideas about reconciling stage and specificity in neo-Piagetian theory in this issue. Summarizes R. Case's central conceptual structure and its relation to other neo-Piagetian theories. Notes similarities between Lewis and Piaget, suggesting that differences adhere to a limited number of general laws instead of being…