Considers the mind of the epistemic psychologist, a constructivist knowledge creator within a scientific framework, guided by the social world of scientific institutions. Suggests that Piaget and Vygotsky shared respect for complexity of phenomena and were consistently developmental in their theories. A reconsideration of their common heritage…

In this paper, we consider how the life story develops through the creation of self-event connections in narrating experiences. We first outline the ways in which such connections have been implied by existing work on the life story, and then consider the varieties of such connections that we see in our own work. That work suggests that self-event…

Focuses on Nelson et al's use of the term "theory of mind" and its meaning; alternatives to theory of mind; theories of theory of mind; arguments against theory of mind; and language and theory of mind. (KB)

Replies to commentaries by Mandler (1988) and Rochat and Striano (1988), focusing on Mandler's comments. Maintains that their disagreements are the result of deep meta-theoretical differences regarding a representational theory of mind rather than misrepresentations of fact. Discusses how their meta-theoretical differences result in several basic…

Constructivist theory must choose between the hypothesis that felt perturbation drives cognitive development (the priority of felt perturbation) and the hypothesis that the particular process that eventually produces new cognitive structures first produces felt perturbation (the continuity of process). There is ambivalence in Piagetian theory…

Argues that the limited resources with which organisms start their development make possible certain kinds of learning which otherwise would be highly problematical. Discusses limitations of the cognitive structure of the organism, learning, and its problems in connectionism. Maintains that the knowledge gained from efforts to overcome problems…

Comments on Raftopoulos article (PS 528 649) on facilitative effect of cognitive limitation in development and connectionist models. Argues that the use of neural networks within an "Artificial Life" perspective can more effectively contribute to the study of the role of cognitive limitations in development and their genetic basis than…

Reviews Karmiloff-Smith's "Beyond Modularity," suggesting that her work highlights phenomena that seem counter intuitive when regarded from current developmental frameworks, and advocates that understanding them requires more complex perspectives than can be supported by either extreme nativist or domain-general models of cognitive…

Notes that Nelson, Plesa, and Henseler's (1998) article addresses the issues of where social cognitive knowledge comes from, what form it takes, and whether "theory of mind" is an appropriate description of the social cognitive enterprise. Argues that researchers ought to get beyond the "theory" issue, and focus on the sources…

Comments on Lewis's ideas about reconciling stage and specificity in neo-Piagetian theory in this issue. Focuses on whether general stages, domain specificity, and individual diversity are compatible from a nonlinear, dynamic perspective. Suggests that, by using catastrophe theory, intra- and interindividual diversity and domain specificity can be…

To resolve tension between general stages and conceptual specificity in neo-Piagetian theory, R. Case introduced the idea of central conceptual structures. To resolve difficulties of separating developmental level and conceptual diversity, this article reconceptualizes central conceptual structures as self-organizing systems that stabilize in…

Comments on Lewis's ideas about reconciling stage and specificity in neo-Piagetian theory in this issue. Summarizes R. Case's central conceptual structure and its relation to other neo-Piagetian theories. Notes similarities between Lewis and Piaget, suggesting that differences adhere to a limited number of general laws instead of being…

Draws on recent work leading to new conceptions of learning, induction, transfer, and strategy acquisition. Contends learning is no longer simply the acquisition of behaviors, but also includes storing knowledge about relations in the world, and acquiring structural representations and mental models. Sees learning and the growth of processing…

Examines two theoretical approaches on how we understand our own and others' minds: a causal explanatory and an interpretive social approach. Explores the relations between these views and suggests that the real challenge of the cognitive revolution is to unite the two approaches, to achieve a causal naturalistic account of the acquisition and…

Suggests that a better understanding of the development of children's theories of mind, requires theoretical perspectives that do not privilege the child who conceptualizes or actively participates in social interactions. Proposes that a better understanding of the relationships among brain, psyche, behavior, and culture should be promoted. (AA)