Focuses on Nelson et al's use of the term "theory of mind" and its meaning; alternatives to theory of mind; theories of theory of mind; arguments against theory of mind; and language and theory of mind. (KB)

Replies to commentaries by Mandler (1988) and Rochat and Striano (1988), focusing on Mandler's comments. Maintains that their disagreements are the result of deep meta-theoretical differences regarding a representational theory of mind rather than misrepresentations of fact. Discusses how their meta-theoretical differences result in several basic…

Argues that the limited resources with which organisms start their development make possible certain kinds of learning which otherwise would be highly problematical. Discusses limitations of the cognitive structure of the organism, learning, and its problems in connectionism. Maintains that the knowledge gained from efforts to overcome problems…

Comments on Raftopoulos article (PS 528 649) on facilitative effect of cognitive limitation in development and connectionist models. Argues that the use of neural networks within an "Artificial Life" perspective can more effectively contribute to the study of the role of cognitive limitations in development and their genetic basis than…

Notes that Nelson, Plesa, and Henseler's (1998) article addresses the issues of where social cognitive knowledge comes from, what form it takes, and whether "theory of mind" is an appropriate description of the social cognitive enterprise. Argues that researchers ought to get beyond the "theory" issue, and focus on the sources…

Examines two theoretical approaches on how we understand our own and others' minds: a causal explanatory and an interpretive social approach. Explores the relations between these views and suggests that the real challenge of the cognitive revolution is to unite the two approaches, to achieve a causal naturalistic account of the acquisition and…

Suggests that a better understanding of the development of children's theories of mind, requires theoretical perspectives that do not privilege the child who conceptualizes or actively participates in social interactions. Proposes that a better understanding of the relationships among brain, psyche, behavior, and culture should be promoted. (AA)

Examines Astington and Olson's proposal under the context of von Wright's and Hempel's theories of explanation and understanding. Suggests that for taking children's meaning making seriously, researchers should find a principled way to acknowledge the role of interpretation in scientific thinking even in the making of explanation itself. (AA)

Examines the relationship between causal-explanatory and interpretive-hermeneutic approaches to how we understand our own and others' minds. Suggests that the two approaches discussed by Astington and Olson are mutually enlightening but, contrary to the proposed position, are irreducible to each other. (AA)

Points out agreement that the concepts a child acquires are variants of those exemplified by the cultures in which they grow up. Suggests, however, that learners interpret these cultural practices in terms of models causally determined by their cognitive or representational capacities and by the stock of concepts currently available. (AA)