Much of our real-life decision making is bounded by uncertain information, limitations in cognitive resources, and a lack of time to allocate to the decision process. It is thought that humans overcome these limitations through "satisficing," fast but "good-enough" heuristic decision making that prioritizes some sources of…

While the influence of presentation formats have been widely studied in Bayesian reasoning tasks, we present the first systematic investigation of how presentation formats influence information search decisions. Four experiments were conducted across different probabilistic environments, where subjects (N = 2,858) chose between 2 possible search…

Interacting with a system is key to uncovering its causal structure. A computational framework for interventional causal learning has been developed over the last decade, but how real causal learners might achieve or approximate the computations entailed by this framework is still poorly understood. Here we describe an interactive computer task in…

Additive integration of information is ubiquitous in judgment and has been shown to be effective even when multiplicative rules of probability theory are prescribed. We explore the generality of these findings in the context of estimating probabilities of success in contests. We first define a normative model of these probabilities that takes…

The debate about whether making a risky choice is based on a weighting and adding process has a long history and is still unresolved. To address this long-standing controversy, we developed a comparative paradigm. Participants' eye movements in 2 risky choice tasks that required participants to choose between risky options in single-play and…

A new process model of the interplay between memory and judgment processes was recently suggested, assuming that retrieval fluency--that is, the speed with which objects are recognized--will determine inferences concerning such objects in a single-cue fashion. This aspect of the fluency heuristic, an extension of the recognition heuristic, has…

Previous research has developed a variety of theories explaining when and why people's decisions under risk deviate from the standard economic view of expected utility maximization. These theories are limited in their predictive accuracy in that they do not explain the probabilistic nature of preferential choice, that is, why an individual makes…

The recognition heuristic is a prime example of a boundedly rational mind tool that rests on an evolved capacity, recognition, and exploits environmental structures. When originally proposed, it was conjectured that no other probabilistic cue reverses the recognition-based inference (D. G. Goldstein & G. Gigerenzer, 2002). More recent studies…

The prominent cognitive theories of probability judgment were primarily developed to explain cognitive biases rather than to account for the cognitive processes in probability judgment. In this article the authors compare 3 major theories of the processes and representations in probability judgment: the representativeness heuristic, implemented as…