Examines the reasons for differences in conclusions about the way conditional sentences are comprehended. (AM)

Research supported in part by a graduate traineeship from the National Institute of General Medical Sciences to the author and by a grant from the Advanced Research Project Agency to the Harvard University Center for Cognitive Studies. (VM)

An experiment is described that involved presenting sentences to the subject for study and then testing single words for recognition (the subject had to decide whether the test word was in one of the study sentences). A large priming effect was obtained. (Author/RM)

Two experiments are reported to distinguish between the representation of sentences in immediate versus longer-term memory. It is indicated that the immediate representation is a verbatim image of the sentence but at delays there are both verbatim images and propositional representations. (Author/RM)

A study testing two theories about the processing of ambiguous sentences is reported. Results suggest that parallel processing and reciprocal interactions underlie the comprehension of ambiguous sentences. (RM)

A study is reported investigating the question whether inferences made from sentences occur immediately in comprehension or are in part a function of the way material from sentences is stored in memory. (Author/RM)

Reference is made to a 1973 article of Singer and Rosenberg regarding linguistic integration. Some of their arguments are supported, and certain claims about integration clarified. (RM)

This study was based on that of Jorgensen and Kintsch (1973) regarding verification time and ease of imagery of sentences. The present study concluded that the results of Jorgensen and Kintsch do not distinguish the effects of rated imagery on reaction time from the effects of semantic relatedness and semantic complexity. (Author/RM)

Investigation supported by a grant from the U.S. Office of Education. (VM)

Research is reported in which a memory-for-marked-semantic-features theory was juxtaposed to a memory-for-meaning theory. The results were interpreted as supporting a global memory-for-meaning theory. (Author/RM)

A set of experiments are reported in which it was found that most subjects were better at identifying both meaning and wording changes in concrete sentences and subjects took significantly longer to encode and decode the abstract sentences. Implications of these findings are discussed. (Author/RM)

Three experiments investigated a characteristic of the propositions that underlie sentences. For some of the sentences tested, the same concepts occurred repeatedly across the underlying propositions; for others, concepts were seldom repeated. Repetitions were shown to facilitate sentence processing. (Author/RM)

Research supported in part by U.S. Public Health Service, National Institute of Mental Health. (DD)

Reports on an experiment in which performance on abstract and concrete sentences was compared in a sentence meaning classification task and in a free recall task. Results show that concrete sentences were classified significantly faster than abstract ones. (CLK)