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Sanborn, Adam N.; Mansinghka, Vikash K.; Griffiths, Thomas L. – Psychological Review, 2013
People have strong intuitions about the influence objects exert upon one another when they collide. Because people's judgments appear to deviate from Newtonian mechanics, psychologists have suggested that people depend on a variety of task-specific heuristics. This leaves open the question of how these heuristics could be chosen, and how to…
Descriptors: Heuristics, Statistical Inference, Mechanics (Physics), Intuition
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Goodman, Noah D.; Ullman, Tomer D.; Tenenbaum, Joshua B. – Psychological Review, 2011
The very early appearance of abstract knowledge is often taken as evidence for innateness. We explore the relative learning speeds of abstract and specific knowledge within a Bayesian framework and the role for innate structure. We focus on knowledge about causality, seen as a domain-general intuitive theory, and ask whether this knowledge can be…
Descriptors: Causal Models, Logical Thinking, Cognitive Development, Bayesian Statistics
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Luhmann, Christian C.; Ahn, Woo-kyoung – Psychological Review, 2007
Dealing with alternative causes is necessary to avoid making inaccurate causal inferences from covariation data. However, information about alternative causes is frequently unavailable, rendering them unobserved. The current article reviews the way in which current learning models deal, or could deal, with unobserved causes. A new model of causal…
Descriptors: Inferences, Learning Processes, Probability, Models
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Griffiths, Thomas L.; Tenenbaum, Joshua B. – Psychological Review, 2009
Inducing causal relationships from observations is a classic problem in scientific inference, statistics, and machine learning. It is also a central part of human learning, and a task that people perform remarkably well given its notorious difficulties. People can learn causal structure in various settings, from diverse forms of data: observations…
Descriptors: Causal Models, Prior Learning, Logical Thinking, Statistical Inference
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White, Peter A. – Psychological Review, 2009
Impressions of force are commonplace in the visual perception of objects interacting. It is proposed that these impressions have their source in haptically mediated experiences of exertion of force in actions on objects. Visual impressions of force in interactions between objects occur by a kind of generalization of the proprioceptive impression…
Descriptors: Causal Models, Visual Perception, Cognitive Psychology, Visual Stimuli
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Cheng, Patricia W. – Psychological Review, 1997
An integration of two different approaches to the psychology of causal induction is proposed that overcomes the problems associated with each. The proposal results in a causal power theory of the probabilistic contrast model of P. W. Cheng and L. R. Novick (1990). (SLD)
Descriptors: Causal Models, Etiology, Mathematical Models, Probability
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Berntsen, Dorthe; Rubin, David C.; Bohni, Malene Klindt – Psychological Review, 2008
We welcome the chance to respond to the five main critiques in Monroe and Mineka's postscript to their comment. First, they claimed in their postscript that they never denied that the "Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders" (4th ed., text rev. [DSM-IV-TR]; American Psychiatric Association, 2000) posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)…
Descriptors: Causal Models, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, Mental Disorders, Identification
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Hogarth, Robin M.; Karelaia, Natalia – Psychological Review, 2007
Much research has highlighted incoherent implications of judgmental heuristics, yet other findings have demonstrated high correspondence between predictions and outcomes. At the same time, judgment has been well modeled in the form of as if linear models. Accepting the probabilistic nature of the environment, the authors use statistical tools to…
Descriptors: Heuristics, Cognitive Ability, Grade Point Average, Prediction
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Cheng, Patricia W.; Novick, Laura R. – Psychological Review, 1991
Biases and models usually offered by cognitive and social psychology and by philosophy to explain causal induction are evaluated with respect to focal sets (contextually determined sets of events over which covariation is computed). A probabilistic contrast model is proposed as underlying covariation computation in natural causal induction. (SLD)
Descriptors: Causal Models, Cognitive Psychology, Computation, Induction
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Rhemtulla, Mijke; Xu, Fei – Psychological Review, 2007
Comments on an article by Rips et al. L. J. Rips, S. Blok, and G. Newman (2006) proposed that singular concepts, which support the tracing of individual objects across their existence, are governed by a principle of causal continuity. They purported to show that causal continuity is better than existing theories at explaining judgments of the…
Descriptors: Developmental Psychology, Causal Models, Identification, Evaluative Thinking
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Blok, Sergey V.; Newman, George E.; Rips, Lance J. – Psychological Review, 2007
Responds to comments made by Rhemtulla and Xu on the current authors' original paper Concepts of individual objects (e.g., a favorite chair or pet) include knowledge that allows people to identify these objects, sometimes after long stretches of time. In an earlier article, the authors set out experimental findings and mathematical modeling to…
Descriptors: Identification, Evaluative Thinking, Classification, Concept Formation
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Rips, Lance J.; Blok, Sergey; Newman, George – Psychological Review, 2006
This article considers how people judge the identity of objects (e.g., how people decide that a description of an object at one time, t-sub-0, belongs to the same object as a description of it at another time, t-sub-1). The authors propose a causal continuer model for these judgments, based on an earlier theory by Nozick (1981). According to this…
Descriptors: Causal Models, Attribution Theory, Object Permanence, Psychological Evaluation
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White, Peter A. – Psychological Review, 2006
It is hypothesized that there is a pervasive and fundamental bias in humans' understanding of physical causation: Once the roles of cause and effect are assigned to objects in interactions, people tend to overestimate the strength and importance of the causal object and underestimate that of the effect object in bringing about the outcome. This…
Descriptors: Psychological Evaluation, Evaluation Methods, Influences, Attribution Theory
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Johnson-Laird, P. N.; Girotto, Vittorio; Legrenzi, Paolo – Psychological Review, 2004
This article presents a theory of how individuals reason from inconsistency to consistency. The theory is based on 3 main principles. First, individuals try to construct a single mental model of a possibility that satisfies a current set of propositions, and if the task is impossible, they infer that the set is inconsistent. Second, when an…
Descriptors: Computer Software, Causal Models, Thinking Skills, Theories
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White, Peter A. – Psychological Review, 2005
This paper comments on the articles by Cheng and by Novick and Cheng. It has been claimed that the power PC theory reconciles regularity and power theories of causal judgment by showing how contingency information is used for inferences about unobservable causal powers. Under the causal powers theory causal relations are understood as generative…
Descriptors: Inferences, Attribution Theory, Causal Models, Power Structure
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