I respond to Noddings with further clarification of the notion of empathy and also argue that previous care ethics has put too much of an exclusive emphasis on relationships. I respond to Darwall by pointing out some implausible implications of his own and Kantian views about respect and by showing how a sentimentalist approach can avoid those…

Michael Slote's very interesting work on moral sentimentalism and moral education raises some important questions on the meaning of empathy, the limitations of "inductions", and the development of moral education from the perspective of care ethics. These questions are addressed in this commentary. (Contains 5 notes.)

Although I think most of what Michael Slote asserts in his article "Sentimentalist moral education" is correct, I worry about three important ideas that are conspicuous by their absence. The first is the possibility that human emotions and feelings are inherently cognitive, which is never considered in his psychological account of empathy. The…

Care ethics, and moral sentimentalism more generally, have not developed a picture of moral education that is comparable in scope or depth to the rationalist/Kantian/Rawlsian account of moral education that has been offered by Lawrence Kohlberg. But it is possible to do so if one borrows from the work of Martin Hoffman and makes systematic use of…

Michael Slote proposes a rethinking of moral education from the perspective of a normative ethics of care combined with his distinctive sentimentalist metaethics. I raise questions concerning the role of empathy in Slote's picture and argue that empathy is related to respect and sentiments through which we hold ourselves and one another…

Two of Susan Moller Okin's articles are discussed: "Reason and feeling in thinking about justice", "Ethics" 99(2), 1989: 229-49 and "Mistresses of their own destiny: group rights, gender, and realistic rights of exit", "Ethics" 112(2), 2002: 205-30. Her argument on the foundation necessary for Rawls's…