This article examines the many traces of John Rawls' theory of justice in contemporary philosophy of education. Beyond work that directly explores the educational implications of justice as fairness and political liberalism, there are many interesting debates in philosophy of education that make use of Rawlsian concepts to defend views that go…

In her Exemplarist Moral Theory, Linda Zagzebski argues that we can empirically discover the meaning of moral terms like 'virtue' and 'the good life' by direct reference to moral exemplars -- those people we admire as morally exceptional. Her proposal is promising, because (1) moral exemplars play an important motivating role in moral education,…

There has been a growing literature among philosophers of education on how to frame questions of moral controversy in the classroom. Through the application of hard moral cases that may be said to leave one 'morally dumbfounded', I take up Michael Hand's influential epistemic criterion and attempt to show why its monistic approach is too limited…

In "Two Conceptions of Virtue," Thomas Hill reconstructs the conceptions of virtue, and of proper moral upbringing, found in Kant and Rawls. Here I offer some brief reflections on these conceptions of virtue and its cultivation. I argue that Kant's conception of virtue is grounded in a mistaken conception of desire, and that this…

The ethics assessment industry is currently dominated by the second version of the Defining Issues Test (DIT2). In this article, we describe an alternative assessment instrument called the Sphere-Specific Moral Reasoning and Theory Survey (SMARTS), which measures the respondent's level of moral development in several respects. We describe eight…

The general questions are: what is virtue and how can it be cultivated? The specific focus is on the conceptions of virtue in the works of Immanuel Kant and John Rawls. Kant regarded virtue as a good will that is also strong enough to resist contrary passions, impulses, and inclinations. Childhood training can prepare children for virtue, but…

Moral educators have little to learn from the moral theories in which philosophers routinely trade. These theories--including those by Slote, Hume, and Kant--leave behind the concrete world in which the moral educator labors. As interesting as they may be, they merely devise alternative routes to the same destination--to the main general features…

I respond to Noddings with further clarification of the notion of empathy and also argue that previous care ethics has put too much of an exclusive emphasis on relationships. I respond to Darwall by pointing out some implausible implications of his own and Kantian views about respect and by showing how a sentimentalist approach can avoid those…

Michael Slote's very interesting work on moral sentimentalism and moral education raises some important questions on the meaning of empathy, the limitations of "inductions", and the development of moral education from the perspective of care ethics. These questions are addressed in this commentary. (Contains 5 notes.)

Although I think most of what Michael Slote asserts in his article "Sentimentalist moral education" is correct, I worry about three important ideas that are conspicuous by their absence. The first is the possibility that human emotions and feelings are inherently cognitive, which is never considered in his psychological account of empathy. The…

Care ethics, and moral sentimentalism more generally, have not developed a picture of moral education that is comparable in scope or depth to the rationalist/Kantian/Rawlsian account of moral education that has been offered by Lawrence Kohlberg. But it is possible to do so if one borrows from the work of Martin Hoffman and makes systematic use of…

Michael Slote proposes a rethinking of moral education from the perspective of a normative ethics of care combined with his distinctive sentimentalist metaethics. I raise questions concerning the role of empathy in Slote's picture and argue that empathy is related to respect and sentiments through which we hold ourselves and one another…

Liberals champion the view that promoting autonomy--seeing to it that our children develop into individuals who are self-governing in the conduct of their lives--is a vital aim of education, though one generally accredited as being subsidiary to well-being. Our prime goal in this article is to provide a partial validation of this liberal ideal…

Two of Susan Moller Okin's articles are discussed: "Reason and feeling in thinking about justice", "Ethics" 99(2), 1989: 229-49 and "Mistresses of their own destiny: group rights, gender, and realistic rights of exit", "Ethics" 112(2), 2002: 205-30. Her argument on the foundation necessary for Rawls's…

It is generally supposed that a curriculum should engage students with worthwhile knowledge, which requires an understanding of what it means for something to be worthwhile: a substantive conception of the good. Yet a number of influential curriculum theories deny or undermine one or another aspect of the key assumption upon which a meaningful…