Three studies examined the domain of concepts about dinosaurs in order to assess how the domain might be structured in 4- through 7-year-old children's representations and to explore how the knowledge might be used. Findings indicated that significant differences exist in the way expert and novice children's representations are structured.…

Adolescents with mental retardation viewed a story enacted with props and were asked questions about the knowledge and beliefs of the characters. Subjects performed worse than did nondisabled children matched for mental age. Subjects did better on questions requiring first-order reasoning than on those involving second-order reasoning. (Author/JDD)

Compared and contrasted are the concepts intuition and logic. The ideas of conceptual thought and algorithmic thought are discussed in terms of the world as a labyrinth, intuition and time, and the structure of knowledge. (KR)

Examines two theoretical approaches on how we understand our own and others' minds: a causal explanatory and an interpretive social approach. Explores the relations between these views and suggests that the real challenge of the cognitive revolution is to unite the two approaches, to achieve a causal naturalistic account of the acquisition and…

Suggests that a better understanding of the development of children's theories of mind, requires theoretical perspectives that do not privilege the child who conceptualizes or actively participates in social interactions. Proposes that a better understanding of the relationships among brain, psyche, behavior, and culture should be promoted. (AA)

Examines Astington and Olson's proposal under the context of von Wright's and Hempel's theories of explanation and understanding. Suggests that for taking children's meaning making seriously, researchers should find a principled way to acknowledge the role of interpretation in scientific thinking even in the making of explanation itself. (AA)

Examines the relationship between causal-explanatory and interpretive-hermeneutic approaches to how we understand our own and others' minds. Suggests that the two approaches discussed by Astington and Olson are mutually enlightening but, contrary to the proposed position, are irreducible to each other. (AA)

Points out agreement that the concepts a child acquires are variants of those exemplified by the cultures in which they grow up. Suggests, however, that learners interpret these cultural practices in terms of models causally determined by their cognitive or representational capacities and by the stock of concepts currently available. (AA)