Piagetian moral judgment problems were simplified and tested on first grade children to ascertain whether the simplification would affect the subjects' perceptions of intentionality and punishment. (JMB)

Investigates the relationships among the first three stages of cognitive, role-taking, and moral development in both transitional and nontransitional subjects ages 5 to 14 years in order to determine whether the pattern of associations conformed more adequately to the "functional unity" model or to the "necessary but not…

Results are discussed in terms of Piaget's concept of the parallel development of the cognition of the impersonal and interpersonal worlds. (Authors)

The development of moral judgment in 11-year-old girls is discussed in terms of the evaluation of role taking ability. (ST)

Examined preschool children's conceptions of moral and conventional rules. Children judged the seriousness, rule contingency, rule relativism, and amount of deserved punishment for 10 depicted moral and conventional preschool transgressions. Constant across ages and sexes, children evaluated moral transgressions as more serious offenses and more…

Reports an attempt to test two interpretations of immanent justice responses as causal attributions rather than as moral judgments. Finds older children use causal chains to explain contiguity between misdeed and adversity. Data were interpreted as consistent with an information-processing model of immanent justice responses. (RMH)

Examined 6-, 8-, and 10-year olds' conceptions of flags as social conventions and their understandings of the symbolic and psychological consequences associated with transgressions toward flags. Found that despite age-related increases in understanding of flags as meaningful collective symbols, children at all ages considered transgressions to be…

Makes a case for rereading the fact-value dichotomy that currently divides the contemporaneous literatures dealing with children's moral reasoning development and their evolving theories of mind. Presents findings from two research programs, in which children's beliefs about truth and rightness are combined, to illustrate the natural…

Investigated 4-, 8-, and 11-year-olds' ability to categorize intentionally false and true statements as lies and truths. Found that older children were more likely to categorize false statements as lies and true statements as truths than were 4-year-olds. Antisocial lies were rated as most serious, and "white lies" as least serious.…

Cross-lagged correlational analyses and multiple-regression analyses of the data collected in these two studies supports the causal model that, while intentionality and internality both emerge when a common cognitive construct develops, heightened internality also significantly enhances a child's ability to learn intentionality. (Author/JMB)

Examined contribution of temperamental inhibitory control to conscience development. Found longitudinal stability in inhibitory control from toddlerhood to early school age, with inhibitory control increasing with age, and girls outperforming boys. Reaffirmed links between inhibitory control and multiple, diverse measures of children's conscience…

The hypothesized central role of cognitive development in resolving moral dilemmas was examined in sixth grade and college-age females. Results indicated that sophisticated cognitive operations are a prerequisite to advanced moral judgments. (ST)

Examined judgments of intolerance given by children, adolescents, and adults toward disagreeing others. The evidence suggested that intolerance may be a lower level of reasoning in a social cognitive developmental progression. (Author/DB)

Two classrooms of first graders (N=40) were administered Damon's moral judgment measure, Shure and Spivack's social problem solving measure, and the Stanford-Binet vocabulary. Concurrently, two observers in the children's school environment recorded incidences of successful resolutions of interactions, amount of derogation, and the number of times…

Examines Kohlberg's proposition that both cognitive and perspective-taking development are necessary but not sufficient conditions for moral development by attempting to stimulate moral development. Results are interpreted as confirming Kohlberg's proposition. (RMH)