Discusses the development of thinking from a sociocultural perspective, focusing on how Super and Harkness' (1986) concept of "developmental niche" may be used as a framework for organizing cognitive developmental research in relation to culture. Argues for the utility of this approach in furthering understanding of the precise linkages between…

Comments on Moshman's discussion, in this issue, of reasoning as self-constrained thinking, arguing that differences in type of reasoning constraint probably reflect different knowledge bases but do not necessarily imply different processes. The fact that different tasks require different kinds of knowledge does not mean that different processes…

Proposes a theory of reasoning and outlines four general types of reasoning (case-based, law-based, coherence-based, and dialectical) based on the constraints the reasoning seeks to honor. The development of reasoning is presented as a continuing construction and reconstruction of self-constraints and justifications for those constraints,…

Reviews the literature pertaining to spatial perspective-taking and attempts to account for the inconsistent findings in this area of research by examining the methodological differences between studies. (Author/SS)

Comments on Gauvain's discussion, in this issue, of the development of thinking from a sociocultural perspective, expanding her analysis by comparing research on apes who have developed in natural habitats with apes raised by humans in something resembling a human culture. Argues that the study of nonhuman primates can contribute to the emerging…

Offers a theoretical account of moral rationality within a rational constructivist paradigm examining the nature and relationship of rationality and reasoning. Suggests progressive changes through developmental levels of moral rationality. Proposes a developmental moral epistemology that accommodates moral pluralism to a greater degree than does…

Suggests that constructivist rationality may be more pervasive across cultures than Moshman commits to. Proposes that rationality is not always adequate, and there is a need for essentially moral labor, such as differentiating moral from nonmoral or analyzing differing moral constructs and their potential coexistence, coordination, and structural…