Why is conceptual change difficult yet possible? Ohlsson (2009/this issue) proposes that the answer can be found in the dynamics of resubsumption, or the process by which a domain of experience is resubsumed under an intuitive theory originally constructed to explain some other domain of experience. Here, it is argued that conceptual change is…

This paper argues that the metaphorical representation of concepts and the appropriation of language-based construals can be hypothesized as additional sources of conceptual change alongside those previously proposed. Analyses of construals implicit in the lay and scientific use of the noun "energy" from the perspective of the theory of conceptual…

Replies to commentaries by Mandler (1988) and Rochat and Striano (1988), focusing on Mandler's comments. Maintains that their disagreements are the result of deep meta-theoretical differences regarding a representational theory of mind rather than misrepresentations of fact. Discusses how their meta-theoretical differences result in several basic…

What capabilities are required for an organism to evince an "explicit" understanding of gaze as a mentalistic phenomenon? One possibility is that mentalistic interpretations of gaze, like concepts of unseen, supernatural beings, are culturally-specific concepts, acquired through cultural learning. These abstract concepts may either require a…

The experiments described in the lead articles by Kowalski and Zimiles and by O'Hanlon and Roberson examine factors that lead to color term acquisition. These experiments touch on the debate regarding the relative contributions of language and concepts in word learning. In this reflection, we examine how conclusions concerning the debate depend…

Suggests practical applications of Piagetian theory to reading instruction. (FL)

Examines the distinctions and interrelations between necessary and contingent knowledge and relates these concepts to the distinction between scientific and empirical validity. Considers how these distinctions can be applied to an understanding of morality, arguing for a relational rather than absolutist approach to questions of necessity. (JPB)

Maintains that there are core-specific and non-core-specific domains of knowledge, but that only the core-specific domains benefit from innate skeletal structures. Asserts that core skeletal domains are universally shared, even though their particular foci may vary. Emphasizes that individuals vary in terms of the noncore domains they acquire.…

Responds to Biggs' article on the case presentation approach in clinical supervision, commending the author for drawing together two areas of psychology: case presentation in counselor supervision and cognitive development. Discusses three major contributions of, and three concerns with, Biggs' model. (NB)

Presents a model of the development of desociocentering, decentering relative to the social group, which is based on Piagetian research and theory and Wernerian concepts. (Author/SS)

Argues that causal understanding is a developmental primitive: children develop core concepts of causality at a very early age, causality plays a necessary role in subsequent development across many domains, and basic causal processes can be activated automatically or implicitly. (HTH)

Contrasts Fodor's theory of children's Very Simple Theory of Mind, with the view that children's concepts cross-cut the adult conceptual system: young children do not distinguish between the state of affairs a belief is about and how this state of affairs is thought of, which puts a severe limit on their understanding of belief as distinct from…

In the Soviet theory of cognitive development, originated by Vygotsky and elaborated by Leont'ev, acts occur at three levels of abstraction: activities, actions, and operations. According to this theory, an activity has an associated motive and may function directively as a motive. While many activities are possible, one activity tends to…

This paper examines the nature of concepts and conceptual processes and the manner of their formation. It argues that a process of successive abstraction and systematization is central to the evolution of conceptual structures. Classificatory processes are discussed and three levels of abstraction outlined. (Author/SJL)

Interviews with 4- to 8-year olds indicated that children's understanding of how it is that they can see object develops gradually. This article presents a map of this development in terms of two distinct modes of cognitive functioning, the ikonic mode and concrete symbolic mode, drawn from the interviews and the SOLO (Structure of Learning…