Derives a theoretical statement about children's understanding of the mind from Wittgenstein's private-language argument that understanding the mind involves acquiring rules governing the use of linguistic expressions about the mind. Presents developmental evidence illustrating Wittgenstein's argument and its differences from the simulation and…

Argues that causal understanding is a developmental primitive: children develop core concepts of causality at a very early age, causality plays a necessary role in subsequent development across many domains, and basic causal processes can be activated automatically or implicitly. (HTH)

Maintains that Madole and Oakes' hypotheses are incorrect. Shows that conceptual development frequently goes from the abstract to the concrete and that extensive literature shows that there is more than one kind of categorization. Discusses ways in which perceptual and conceptual categorization differ. (Author/KB)

Responds to Mandler's critique of authors' view of infant categorization. Maintains that their view of infant categorization is not characterized by a shift from one type of category to another but by gradual changes in the kinds of information infants can use in forming categories. Clarifies position regarding a single categorical process using…

Demonstrates the need for a process-oriented, constructivist approach to understanding infants' categorization abilities. Suggests that emphasizing the distinction between perceptual and conceptual categorization has been an obstacle to forging an approach. Proposes a more microanalytic consideration of features available to infants at different…

Presents a framework within which to organize and synthesize existing knowledge about children's understanding of the mental states of imagination, pretense, and dreams. Concludes that by the age of three, children understand important fundamental aspects of the mental nature, origin, and truth-relation of fictional mental states, but that their…

Extends William James' classification of phenomenalistic reality (PR) and analyzes PR using empirical data available in developmental psychology; focuses on the relation of PR to a human subject; to rational constructions; and to the idea of truth. Concludes that the development of phenomenalistic reality is qualitatively different from the…