Maintains that Madole and Oakes' hypotheses are incorrect. Shows that conceptual development frequently goes from the abstract to the concrete and that extensive literature shows that there is more than one kind of categorization. Discusses ways in which perceptual and conceptual categorization differ. (Author/KB)

Responds to Mandler's critique of authors' view of infant categorization. Maintains that their view of infant categorization is not characterized by a shift from one type of category to another but by gradual changes in the kinds of information infants can use in forming categories. Clarifies position regarding a single categorical process using…

Demonstrates the need for a process-oriented, constructivist approach to understanding infants' categorization abilities. Suggests that emphasizing the distinction between perceptual and conceptual categorization has been an obstacle to forging an approach. Proposes a more microanalytic consideration of features available to infants at different…

Extends William James' classification of phenomenalistic reality (PR) and analyzes PR using empirical data available in developmental psychology; focuses on the relation of PR to a human subject; to rational constructions; and to the idea of truth. Concludes that the development of phenomenalistic reality is qualitatively different from the…