Replies to commentaries by Mandler (1988) and Rochat and Striano (1988), focusing on Mandler's comments. Maintains that their disagreements are the result of deep meta-theoretical differences regarding a representational theory of mind rather than misrepresentations of fact. Discusses how their meta-theoretical differences result in several basic…

Reviews Karmiloff-Smith's "Beyond Modularity," suggesting that her work highlights phenomena that seem counter intuitive when regarded from current developmental frameworks, and advocates that understanding them requires more complex perspectives than can be supported by either extreme nativist or domain-general models of cognitive…

Paul B. Baltes and his colleagues, who are among the most prominent contemporary wisdom researchers, define wisdom as "expert knowledge in the domain fundamental pragmatics of life." By contrast, this article argues that the definition, operationalization, and measurement of wisdom should not be reduced to expertise and that the term wisdom should…

To resolve tension between general stages and conceptual specificity in neo-Piagetian theory, R. Case introduced the idea of central conceptual structures. To resolve difficulties of separating developmental level and conceptual diversity, this article reconceptualizes central conceptual structures as self-organizing systems that stabilize in…

Comments on Lewis's ideas about reconciling stage and specificity in neo-Piagetian theory in this issue. Summarizes R. Case's central conceptual structure and its relation to other neo-Piagetian theories. Notes similarities between Lewis and Piaget, suggesting that differences adhere to a limited number of general laws instead of being…