The recent proliferation of research on children's supernatural concepts is noteworthy, as this work is necessary for a full account of human cognition. Despite this advancement in our field, there is a lingering tendency for scholars to exotify supernatural concepts; to treat them as distinct or special. Arguments have been raised that these…

The standard view on Theory of Mind (ToM) is that the mastery of the false belief (FB) task around age 4 marks the ontogenetic emergence of full-fledged meta-representational ToM. Recently, a puzzling finding has emerged: Once children master the FB task, they begin to fail true belief (TB) control tasks. This finding threatens the validity of FB…

Children's understanding of death has been a topic of interest to researchers investigating the development of children's thinking and clinicians focusing on children's coping with the death of a loved one. Traditionally, researchers in cognitive development have mainly focused on death from a biological perspective. Current research suggests that…

In Study 1, 103 children ages 4 through 10 answered questions about their concept of and belief in luck, and completed a story task assessing their use of luck as an explanation for events. The interview captured a curvilinear trajectory of children's belief in luck from tentative belief at age 4 to full belief at age 6, weakening belief at age 8,…

The study sought to investigate conceptual change process. It is specifically aimed to probe children's initial ideas and how or to what way those ideas alter in the long run. A total of 18 children volunteered and participated in the study. Individual interviews were conducted. The children were asked to define the concept of evaporation, explain…

Existing evidence suggests that children, when they first pass standard theory-of-mind tasks, still fail to understand the essential aspectuality of beliefs and other propositional attitudes: such attitudes refer to objects only under specific aspects. Oedipus, for example, believes Yocaste (his mother) is beautiful, but this does not imply that…

Why is conceptual change difficult yet possible? Ohlsson (2009/this issue) proposes that the answer can be found in the dynamics of resubsumption, or the process by which a domain of experience is resubsumed under an intuitive theory originally constructed to explain some other domain of experience. Here, it is argued that conceptual change is…

While recognizing major contributions of the contemporary theory-of-mind framework, we identify conceptual and cultural gaps with respect to its inattention to deontic considerations. The framework has tended to portray behavior as purely self-directed, thereby neglecting everyday reasoners' understanding of behavior as normatively based. However,…

Deceptive box experiments showed that when children see the expected contents before the boxes are changed, it is easier to report their own and a puppet's initial true belief, but also a puppet's current false belief. Results support the "reality masking hypothesis," that facilitation is due to the belief option being linked with a…

Young children's naive beliefs about physics are commonly studied as isolated pieces of knowledge. The current paper takes a different approach. It asks whether preschoolers interlink individual beliefs into larger configurations or Gestalts. Such Gestalts bring together knowledge such as how an object's mass relates to its sinking speed, how an…

Contrasts Fodor's theory of children's Very Simple Theory of Mind, with the view that children's concepts cross-cut the adult conceptual system: young children do not distinguish between the state of affairs a belief is about and how this state of affairs is thought of, which puts a severe limit on their understanding of belief as distinct from…

Explores the dissociation between the performance by children with autism on false belief tasks, on which they do poorly, and false photograph, false map, and false drawing tasks, on which they do well. Suggesting domain specificity in the development of representational system, the results supported the modularity of theory of mind and the…

Two experiments tested two, three, and four year olds' ability to understand false beliefs. Results of both experiments support earlier claims that an understanding of false beliefs and deceptive ploys emerges at around age four. Two and three year olds can be led to produce such ploys but show no clear understanding of their effect. (GLR)

Studied the ideas of 5-year olds regarding the concept of light, using individual interviews. Found that children identify light with its source or its effect rather than as a distinct entity, a representation at odds with the scientific concept of light. (Author/JPB)

Two studies probed 3- to 6-year olds' beliefs about wishing and its efficacy. Study 1 showed that children had considerable knowledge about wishing and an age-related decrease in beliefs about its efficacy. Study 2 suggested that children reconcile beliefs in wishing efficacy with knowledge about mental/physical relations by situating them more…