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Direct linkDavies, Lynn – Comparative Education, 2011
This paper examines capacity development in education in fragile contexts. This is a current concern for donors and development partners, but there has been little work on the nexus between capacity, education and fragility. The paper examines the concept of fragility and the particular problems in education associated with fragile contexts. The…
Descriptors: Foreign Countries, Governance, Cheating, Deception
Rothstein, Richard – National Center on Performance Incentives, 2008
Accountability and performance incentive plans in education are compromised by goal distortion, gaming, and corruption. Education policy makers who design such plans have paid insufficient attention to similar experiences in other fields. This paper describes institutions in health care, job training and welfare administration, and in the private…
Descriptors: Accountability, Public Sector, Job Performance, Incentives
The Inevitable Corruption of Indicators and Educators through High-Stakes Testing. Executive Summary
Download full textNichols, Sharon L.; Berliner, David C. – Education Policy Research Unit, 2005
This research provides lengthy proof of a principle of social science known as Campbell's law: "The more any quantitative social indicator is used for social decision-making, the more subject it will be to corruption pressures and the more apt it will be to distort and corrupt the social processes it is intended to monitor." Applying…
Descriptors: Cheating, Dropouts, High Stakes Tests, Social Indicators
Nichols, Sharon L.; Berliner, David C. – Education Policy Research Unit, 2005
This research provides lengthy proof of a principle of social science known as Campbell's law: "The more any quantitative social indicator is used for social decision-making, the more subject it will be to corruption pressures and the more apt it will be to distort and corrupt the social processes it is intended to monitor." Applying…
Descriptors: Cheating, Dropouts, High Stakes Tests, Social Indicators
