We argue that the nativist-empiricist debate in developmental psychology is distorted, both theoretically and methodologically, by a shared framework of assumptions concerning the nature of representation. In particular, both sides of the debate assume models of representation that make the emergence of representation impossible. This, in turn,…

We would like to thank the commentators for their time and thoughtfulness--the commentaries are, in general, engaging and informative. Interestingly, most of the discussion has to do with the nature of representation, not with our basic critique of nativist infant research. Regarding the latter, there seems to be general agreement. Regarding…

States that Demetriou and Raftopoulos's theory of cognitive developmental change based on the nature of representation is flawed. Argues against theme of representation as encoding as well as an alternative model of representation as interactivism. Concludes that other issues such as architectural support, variation and selective retention,…

An argument is presented showing that the postulation of psychological capabilities that are jointly necessary to and specific to other capabilities involves strong theoretical commitments that have not generally been recognized. Examples are drawn from language development and evolution. (SS)

Notes that the pragmatist approach to the study of mind is represented in psychology by Piaget's action orientation. Believes, however, that American empiricists regularly misinterpreted Piaget's approach. Generally supports Barrouillet and Poirier's advocacy of Piaget's orientation, but presents some disagreements with Barrouillet and Poirier as…

Asserts that developmental psychology's assumption that representation has nature of encoding is false; offers alternative model of representation based on the pragmatics of action. Argues that "frame problems" originate in the inherent requirement that encoding representations carry explicit content. Maintains that these problems impact…