The concept of giftedness is frequently challenged on the grounds that 1) it is a ragged or slippery concept, 2) it is inegalitarian, 3) it is culturally arbitrary, and 4) it fails to distinguish children with natural ability from children who are parentally pressured. I argue that all these charges are unfounded. We "can" distinguish between naturally gifted and pressured children, but not of course unless we embrace the distinction conceptually. Contrary to the egalitarian argument, moreover, it is claimed that the concept of natural ability (not to be confused with the concept of innate intelligence) is required for a just approach to education. Without this concept, two kinds of children are likely to escape our notice: the bright, disadvantaged underachiever and the successful but pressured "trophy child". Both, it is argued, require identification and support. Slippery slope objections are addressed, as is the charge of cultural arbitrariness. I conclude that giftedness is conceptually challenging because decisions about who is and is not gifted bring us to the threshold of our disagreements about values. The ball is then thrown back into the detractors' court. (Contains 6 notes.)