People have strong intuitions about the influence objects exert upon one another when they collide. Because people's judgments appear to deviate from Newtonian mechanics, psychologists have suggested that people depend on a variety of task-specific heuristics. This leaves open the question of how these heuristics could be chosen, and how to…

A popular distinction in cognitive and social psychology has been between "intuitive" and "deliberate" judgments. This juxtaposition has aligned in dual-process theories of reasoning associative, unconscious, effortless, heuristic, and suboptimal processes (assumed to foster intuitive judgments) versus rule-based, conscious, effortful, analytic,…

We introduce a game theory model of individual decisions to cooperate by contributing personal resources to group decisions versus by free riding on the contributions of other members. In contrast to most public-goods games that assume group returns are linear in individual contributions, the present model assumes decreasing marginal group…

Heuristics embodying limited information search and noncompensatory processing of information can yield robust performance relative to computationally more complex models. One criticism raised against heuristics is the argument that complexity is hidden in the calculation of the cue order used to make predictions. We discuss ways to order cues…

The theory of probabilistic mental models (PMM; G. Gigerenzer, U. Hoffrage, & H. Kleinbolting, 1991) has had a major influence on the field of judgment and decision making, with the most recent important modifications to PMM theory being the identification of several fast and frugal heuristics (G. Gigerenzer & D. G. Goldstein, 1996). These…

M. R. Dougherty, A. M. Franco-Watkins, and R. Thomas (2008) conjectured that fast and frugal heuristics need an automatic frequency counter for ordering cues. In fact, only a few heuristics order cues, and these orderings can arise from evolutionary, social, or individual learning, none of which requires automatic frequency counting. The idea that…

How do people select among different strategies to accomplish a given task? Across disciplines, the strategy selection problem represents a major challenge. We propose a quantitative model that predicts how selection emerges through the interplay among strategies, cognitive capacities, and the environment. This interplay carves out for each…

Comments on the article by E. Brandstatter, G. Gigerenzer, and R. Hertwig (2006). Resolution of debates in cognition usually comes from the introduction of constraints in the form of new data about either the process or representation. Decision research, in contrast, has relied predominantly on testing models by examining their fit to choices. The…

Comments on the article by E. Brandstatter, G. Gigerenzer, and R. Hertwig (2006). The authors discuss the priority heuristic, a recent model for decisions under risk. They reanalyze the experimental validity of this approach and discuss how these results compare with cumulative prospect theory, the currently most established model in behavioral…

E. Brandstatter, G. Gigerenzer, and R. Hertwig (2006) contended that their priority heuristic, a type of lexicographic semiorder model, is more accurate than cumulative prospect theory (CPT) or transfer of attention exchange (TAX) models in describing risky decisions. However, there are 4 problems with their argument. First, their heuristic is not…

Probability theory has long been taken as the self-evident norm against which to evaluate inductive reasoning, and classical demonstrations of violations of this norm include the conjunction error and base-rate neglect. Many of these phenomena require multiplicative probability integration, whereas people seem more inclined to linear additive…

E. Brandstatter, G. Gigerenzer, and R. Hertwig (2006) showed that the priority heuristic matches or outperforms modifications of expected utility theory in predicting choice in 4 diverse problem sets. M. H. Birnbaum (2008) argued that sets exist in which the opposite is true. The authors agree--but stress that all choice strategies have regions of…

A localist, parallel constraint satisfaction, artificial neural network model is presented that accounts for a broad collection of attitude and attitude-change phenomena. The network represents the attitude object and cognitions and beliefs related to the attitude, as well as how to integrate a persuasive message into this network. Short-term…

Much research has highlighted incoherent implications of judgmental heuristics, yet other findings have demonstrated high correspondence between predictions and outcomes. At the same time, judgment has been well modeled in the form of as if linear models. Accepting the probabilistic nature of the environment, the authors use statistical tools to…

This project reconciles historically distinct paradigms at the interface between individual and social choice theory, as well as between rational and behavioral decision theory. The authors combine a utility-maximizing prescriptive rule for sophisticated approval voting with the ignorance prior heuristic from behavioral decision research and two…