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Bonawitz, Elizabeth; Ullman, Tomer D.; Bridgers, Sophie; Gopnik, Alison; Tenenbaum, Joshua B. – Cognitive Science, 2019
Constructing an intuitive theory from data confronts learners with a "chicken-and-egg" problem: The laws can only be expressed in terms of the theory's core concepts, but these concepts are only meaningful in terms of the role they play in the theory's laws; how can a learner discover appropriate concepts and laws simultaneously, knowing…
Descriptors: Theories, Intuition, Magnets, Young Children
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Shafto, Patrick; Kemp, Charles; Mansinghka, Vikash; Tenenbaum, Joshua B. – Cognition, 2011
Most natural domains can be represented in multiple ways: we can categorize foods in terms of their nutritional content or social role, animals in terms of their taxonomic groupings or their ecological niches, and musical instruments in terms of their taxonomic categories or social uses. Previous approaches to modeling human categorization have…
Descriptors: Cognitive Processes, Classification, Inferences, Simulation
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Kemp, Charles; Shafto, Patrick; Tenenbaum, Joshua B. – Cognitive Psychology, 2012
Humans routinely make inductive generalizations about unobserved features of objects. Previous accounts of inductive reasoning often focus on inferences about a single object or feature: accounts of causal reasoning often focus on a single object with one or more unobserved features, and accounts of property induction often focus on a single…
Descriptors: Generalization, Logical Thinking, Inferences, Probability
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Kemp, Charles; Tenenbaum, Joshua B. – Psychological Review, 2009
Everyday inductive inferences are often guided by rich background knowledge. Formal models of induction should aim to incorporate this knowledge and should explain how different kinds of knowledge lead to the distinctive patterns of reasoning found in different inductive contexts. This article presents a Bayesian framework that attempts to meet…
Descriptors: Logical Thinking, Inferences, Statistical Inference, Models
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Griffiths, Thomas L.; Tenenbaum, Joshua B. – Psychological Review, 2009
Inducing causal relationships from observations is a classic problem in scientific inference, statistics, and machine learning. It is also a central part of human learning, and a task that people perform remarkably well given its notorious difficulties. People can learn causal structure in various settings, from diverse forms of data: observations…
Descriptors: Causal Models, Prior Learning, Logical Thinking, Statistical Inference
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Perfors, Amy; Tenenbaum, Joshua B.; Griffiths, Thomas L.; Xu, Fei – Cognition, 2011
We present an introduction to Bayesian inference as it is used in probabilistic models of cognitive development. Our goal is to provide an intuitive and accessible guide to the "what", the "how", and the "why" of the Bayesian approach: what sorts of problems and data the framework is most relevant for, and how and why it may be useful for…
Descriptors: Bayesian Statistics, Cognitive Psychology, Inferences, Cognitive Development
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Perfors, Amy; Tenenbaum, Joshua B.; Wonnacott, Elizabeth – Journal of Child Language, 2010
We present a hierarchical Bayesian framework for modeling the acquisition of verb argument constructions. It embodies a domain-general approach to learning higher-level knowledge in the form of inductive constraints (or overhypotheses), and has been used to explain other aspects of language development such as the shape bias in learning object…
Descriptors: Verbs, Inferences, Language Acquisition, Bayesian Statistics
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Baker, Chris L.; Saxe, Rebecca; Tenenbaum, Joshua B. – Cognition, 2009
Humans are adept at inferring the mental states underlying other agents' actions, such as goals, beliefs, desires, emotions and other thoughts. We propose a computational framework based on Bayesian inverse planning for modeling human action understanding. The framework represents an intuitive theory of intentional agents' behavior based on the…
Descriptors: Inferences, Cognitive Development, Models, Computation
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Schulz, Laura E.; Goodman, Noah D.; Tenenbaum, Joshua B.; Jenkins, Adrianna C. – Cognition, 2008
Given minimal evidence about novel objects, children might learn only relationships among the specific entities, or they might make a more abstract inference, positing classes of entities and the relations that hold among those classes. Here we show that preschoolers (mean: 57 months) can use sparse data about perceptually unique objects to infer…
Descriptors: Novelty (Stimulus Dimension), Preschool Children, Inferences, Abstract Reasoning
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Shafto, Patrick; Kemp, Charles; Bonawitz, Elizabeth Baraff; Coley, John D.; Tenenbaum, Joshua B. – Cognition, 2008
Different intuitive theories constrain and guide inferences in different contexts. Formalizing simple intuitive theories as probabilistic processes operating over structured representations, we present a new computational model of category-based induction about causally transmitted properties. A first experiment demonstrates undergraduates'…
Descriptors: Causal Models, Logical Thinking, Cognitive Psychology, Inferences
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Krynski, Tevye R.; Tenenbaum, Joshua B. – Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 2007
Leading accounts of judgment under uncertainty evaluate performance within purely statistical frameworks, holding people to the standards of classical Bayesian (A. Tversky & D. Kahneman, 1974) or frequentist (G. Gigerenzer & U. Hoffrage, 1995) norms. The authors argue that these frameworks have limited ability to explain the success and…
Descriptors: Inferences, Norms, Causal Models, Bayesian Statistics
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Xu, Fei; Tenenbaum, Joshua B. – Developmental Science, 2007
We report a new study testing our proposal that word learning may be best explained as an approximate form of Bayesian inference (Xu & Tenenbaum, in press). Children are capable of learning word meanings across a wide range of communicative contexts. In different contexts, learners may encounter different sampling processes generating the examples…
Descriptors: Semantics, Bayesian Statistics, Sampling, Inferences
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Xu, Fei; Tenenbaum, Joshua B. – Psychological Review, 2007
The authors present a Bayesian framework for understanding how adults and children learn the meanings of words. The theory explains how learners can generalize meaningfully from just one or a few positive examples of a novel word's referents, by making rational inductive inferences that integrate prior knowledge about plausible word meanings with…
Descriptors: Prior Learning, Inferences, Associative Learning, Vocabulary Development
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Sobel, David M.; Tenenbaum, Joshua B.; Gopnik, Alison – Cognitive Science, 2004
Previous research suggests that children can infer causal relations from patterns of events. However, what appear to be cases of causal inference may simply reduce to children recognizing relevant associations among events, and responding based on those associations. To examine this claim, in Experiments 1 and 2, children were introduced to a…
Descriptors: Preschool Children, Inferences, Prediction, Cognitive Processes
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Griffiths, Thomas L.; Tenenbaum, Joshua B. – Cognitive Psychology, 2005
We present a framework for the rational analysis of elemental causal induction--learning about the existence of a relationship between a single cause and effect--based upon causal graphical models. This framework makes precise the distinction between causal structure and causal strength: the difference between asking whether a causal relationship…
Descriptors: Probability, Logical Thinking, Inferences, Causal Models