We argue that the nativist-empiricist debate in developmental psychology is distorted, both theoretically and methodologically, by a shared framework of assumptions concerning the nature of representation. In particular, both sides of the debate assume models of representation that make the emergence of representation impossible. This, in turn,…

Notes that the pragmatist approach to the study of mind is represented in psychology by Piaget's action orientation. Believes, however, that American empiricists regularly misinterpreted Piaget's approach. Generally supports Barrouillet and Poirier's advocacy of Piaget's orientation, but presents some disagreements with Barrouillet and Poirier as…

Asserts that developmental psychology's assumption that representation has nature of encoding is false; offers alternative model of representation based on the pragmatics of action. Argues that "frame problems" originate in the inherent requirement that encoding representations carry explicit content. Maintains that these problems impact…