In this article, we tackle the phenomenon of what seems to be a misunderstanding between science education theory and philosophy of science--one which does not seem to have received any attention in the literature. While there seems to be a consensus within the realm of science education on limiting or altogether denying the explanatory role of scientific laws (particularly in contrast with "theories"), "none" of the canonical models of scientific explanation (covering law, statistical relevance, unification, mechanistic-causal, pragmatic) lends any support to this view of laws. We will reconstruct three different versions of this demotion of laws (i.e., laws are merely descriptive; laws are explanatory only of singular events, not of laws; laws are explanatory but only in a "superficial" way), propose possible grounds for them, and illustrate why these perspectives pose a conceptual challenge as they contrast with epistemological approaches to the problem of explanation. We will also suggest the potential negative outcomes that would arise from science teachers adopting these approaches in the classroom when aiming to assist students in moving beyond mere description and towards explanation.