The information asymmetry and inequitable consumer dynamics that have existed in the market for used cars are strikingly similar to problems encountered by transfer students in higher education. Specifically, we can think of transfer articulation as a marketplace, where students are the buyers, colleges and universities are the sellers, and transactions involve the seller applying the buyer's prior academic work toward the satisfaction of degree requirements. In the case of the transfer articulation marketplace, the adverse selection issue is clear, students suffer financial loss if they choose a lemon program that recognizes little prior work, particularly if they are unable to realize this until after they have "bought" the new college or university experience. Similar to the used car market, low-income and minority students are far more reliant upon the transfer articulation marketplace. Thus, information asymmetry in transfer articulation translates into market inefficiencies that lead to significant equity issues. In this article, we consider the subtle and often misunderstood reasons that give rise to the significant inefficiencies in transfer articulation, and we discuss some of the measures that can be taken to alleviate adverse transfer outcomes.