The cognitive model of moral education, based on abstract moral reasoning, is largely a male model. The author argues that educators have ignored the voice of women when thinking about, planning, and implementing moral education in the schools. The feminine model is described and avenues for implementation are proposed. (Author/JOW)

Two studies investigated the attribution of action to beliefs and desires in 15 adults and 45 children. Children and adults shared a similar construal of human action in terms of beliefs, desires, and false beliefs. (RJC)

Responds to Wallis Suchting's essay on the nature of scientific thought. Argues that there are obstacles to knowledge and that scientific thought, to be successful, must adapt itself to those obstacles. Concludes that the combination of imagination and formalization is universal throughout post-Galilean science. (JRH)

Discusses Kris N. Kirby's work on signal detection theory and its application to Watson's selection task. Identifies problems with the design and interpretation of Kirby's card-selection experiments. (DR)

Discusses Over and Evans' alternative interpretations to Kris N. Kirby's card-selection tasks and finds empirical difficulties. Cites the potentially important contribution of Over and Evans to understanding of the card-selection task by applying the notion of epistemic utility. (DR)

Children of 4 to 10 years of age were given 2 class inclusion tasks. Younger children's performance was inflated by guessing. Scores were higher in the marked task than in the unmarked task as a result of differing rates of inclusion logic. Children's verbal justifications closely approximated estimates of their true competence. (GLR)

This response to Stanovich (EC 607 092) considers the relationship between rationality and intelligence. It sees rationality as a relatively minor part of intelligence and proposes the concept of practical intelligence (or the lack thereof) as an alternative to Stanovich's concept of dysrationalia. (DB)

This paper responds to reactions to the proposal of a new learning disability, dysrationalia, by suggesting that alternative ideas of "practical intelligence" are equally inexact, that rationality must be defined broadly, and that epistemological relativism can be carried too far. (DB)

Provides a critical analysis of K. E. Stanovich's argument for the use of the concept of dysrationalia in educational research. It argues that the concept of dysrationalia must be better conceptualized and elaborated, encompass a theory, be operationalized, have convergent and discriminant validation, and have safeguards against misuse. (GLR)

Three studies of preadolescents and college students found that many children and adults failed to give logically correct answers when presented with misleading weight conservation questions. The results show the importance of suggestibility and context. (MDM)

Considers reasons for the lack of interaction between dramatistic studies in rhetoric and argumentation theory. Proposes a rapprochement based on the implementing of contextualist assumptions in a critical argumentation. Traces the implications of Kenneth Burke's contextualist and dramatistic viewpoint for the study of argument. (NH)

Defends deductivism, the view that the only valid arguments are deductively valid arguments, and that deductive logic is the only logic that is or is needed. Explains the validity and soundness of some inductive arguments in terms of this view. Contains 12 references. (Author/WRM)

This paper examines a cognitive bias whereby respondents in postcommunist Bulgaria systematically decrease their self estimates on material welfare in contrast to the well-established status-enhancement bias. The analysis shows that the main reason for the occurrence of status-devaluation is the experience of relative deprivation in postcommunism,…

The subject of this article is the frame problem, as conceived by certain cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind, notably Fodor for whom it stands as a fundamental obstacle to progress in cognitive science. The challenge is to explain the capacity of so-called informationally unencapsulated cognitive processes to deal effectively with…

We present a framework for the rational analysis of elemental causal induction--learning about the existence of a relationship between a single cause and effect--based upon causal graphical models. This framework makes precise the distinction between causal structure and causal strength: the difference between asking whether a causal relationship…