This article critically examines dominant formulations of epistemic injustice, focusing on Miranda Fricker's tradition and its broader influence. We argue that much of the literature on epistemic injustice is formulated within a specific Western world-picture, and we discuss its implications. A significant source of this confinement is the view of "language" as merely a tool for communication. Drawing on Wittgenstein, we argue that this way of conceiving language ignores its deeper connections to our "forms of life" and that the generalization of epistemic injustice definitions, intended to be universally applicable, perpetuates "intergenerational formative epistemic injustice," which has persisted since colonial "times." This, in turn, limits epistemic capacity formation and the theory's applicability in different contexts, such that claims of including marginalized ways of knowing may, in fact, facilitate their co-optation and assimilation within a Western framework. Given the global diversity of epistemic harm and its intergenerational character, this article argues that the disaggregation of the scholarship and the recognition of diverse world-pictures as constitutive of its conceptual formation are essential to disrupting epistemic injustice.